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introduction
The last volume of this publication featured an article, The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in Ecuador’s Amazon, 
which described how one large transnational corporation stalled 
attempts to hold it liable for massive environmental and health 
damages by resorting to international arbitration pursuant to the 
U.S.-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty (BIT).1 This escape — 
even if only temporary — from final resolution of seventeen 
years of litigation illustrates a critical accountability gap result-
ing from a triangular relationship between the host state, the 
transnational corporation/foreign investor, and the individual 
or community of victims. In a world of as-yet un-harmonized 
bodies of international law, there is no single domestic or 
supranational forum in which all three actors may easily appear. 
Accordingly, this article argues that, with appropriate modifica-
tions, the regional human rights systems could serve as a forum 
in which host states and foreign investors could be held jointly 
accountable to victims who otherwise pay the greatest price of 
continued impunity.
The relationships at issue in this article lie at the intersec-
tion of international human rights and international investment 
law, two separate bodies of law that impose some limits on state 
sovereignty. States have negotiated international human rights 
law to govern their obligations to individuals and communities. 
In the realm of international investment law, states also fre-
quently intervene to negotiate a special set of protections for 
foreign investments and investors against host states through 
instruments like BITs. Individuals, communities, and corpora-
tions, meanwhile, are meant to handle their claims against one 
another before domestic courts, in which the state is generally 
protected by sovereign immunity. This entire system is based 
on a fundamentally false underlying premise that powerful eco-
nomic non-state actors are on the same level as individuals and 
communities, and that all require the protections of international 
law against abuses by more powerful states. However, the largest 
corporations in a hyper-globalized economy are more economi-
cally powerful than the governments of less developed states.2 
As a consequence, individuals and communities are at times 
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subject to exploitation by either or both states and corporations, 
often through some degree of coordinated action, mutual sup-
port, or acquiescence.
The good news is that debate in the field of business and 
human rights, led by the pioneering work of UN Special 
Representative John Ruggie,3 is very much alive. Moreover, 
lawyers and scholars in both international human rights and 
international investment law are looking beyond legal com-
partments and discussing how the two fields ought to interact. 
The investment law side has surveyed case law coming out of 
the regional human rights systems, seeing how they balance 
property rights, economic interests, and other human rights fac-
tors, and essentially concluded that the Inter-American system, 
at least, “is not the forum to protect business activity against 
arbitrary acts of the state.”4 The human rights side has argued 
that a state’s human rights obligations should be taken into 
account when international arbitration tribunals rule on that 
state’s obligations under a BIT and has lamented the general 
lack of transparency and opportunities for public participation 
in international arbitration.5 But, there is not as of yet a forum 
in which these two bodies of law are put on the same level or 
the three parties — host states, foreign investors, and individual 
or community victims — can simultaneously resolve all their 
claims against one another. Moreover, rather than functioning in 
tandem to resolve all related claims, the splitting of jurisdictions 
and parties often results in continued impunity as in the case in 
the seventeen-year litigation history of Lago Agrio.
For affected communities, the connection between corporate and state 















It is relatively easy to argue for closing this accountability 
gap in which both states and foreign investors often escape full 
responsibility and victims continue to be denied justice. The 
problem comes in identifying a possible or appropriate forum 
in which this could occur. Domestic courts in the investor’s 
host state are problematic because (1) depending on the level of 
judicial independence, these courts may not be willing or politi-
cally able to hold powerful foreign investors or state entities 
to account; (2) if they are willing to hold investors to account, 
they still may lack jurisdiction over the state entities that ought 
to share in a portion of damages; and (3) even if willing, they 
may be unable to provide sufficient due process guarantees and 
impartiality to satisfy the high and flexible standards required 
by BITs, allowing investors recourse to international arbitration 
against the host state. Domestic courts in the investor’s home 
state or another state that offers more judicial independence and 
a more impartial forum are often limited because (1) they may 
not have jurisdiction over 
the claims of foreign plain-
tiffs alleging extraterritorial 
violations; (2) even if the 
court does have jurisdiction, 
it may be able to avoid hear-
ing such a claim through a 
doctrine such as forum non 
conveniens; and (3) unless 
the foreign (host) state 
waives sovereign immunity, 
only the investor will be held 
to account although the state 
or state entities may bear a 
portion of the responsibility.
International forums, 
meanwhile, are essentially 
specialized forums applying 
specialized bodies of law 
that apply either between 
states or in a unidirectional 
claim from a class of pri-
vate actors — individuals, 
communities, non-state 
entities — against the state. 
Unsurprisingly, these inter-
national forums tend to reflect and replicate economic and other 
power imbalances. Among the international forums, regional 
human rights systems have developed significantly in recent 
decades and are often the most effective mechanism for holding 
states accountable to individuals and communities.6 Yet, (1) their 
jurisdiction depends on state consent; (2) they lack very effec-
tive enforcement mechanisms; and (3) in order to maintain state 
consent to jurisdiction and cooperation with final decisions, they 
generally award non-monetary or minimal monetary remedies to 
victims. On the investment law side are international arbitration 
forums, through which foreign investors have direct recourse 
against host states as a result of BITs negotiated on their behalf 
by the investor’s home state. Unlike regional human rights bod-
ies, international arbitration tribunals can and do award large 
monetary damages to foreign investors7 and these awards are 
generally enforceable in domestic jurisdictions under the widely 
ratified New York Convention.8 Yet, although human rights 
advocates recently won the right to intervene in a single inter-
national arbitration between foreign investors and South Africa 
as a host state, this intervention was only for a limited purpose.9 
Such forums have no jurisdiction over victims’ human rights or 
torts claims against either states or foreign investors and, more-
over, specialize only in international investment law.
What is worse for victims, states facing possible litigation 
before both international forums — regional human rights 
organs and international arbitration forums — may encounter 
perverse incentives. Because of the disparity between judgments 
awarded by international arbitration tribunals and human rights 
bodies,10 states would seem to have every incentive to avoid giv-
ing the foreign investor cause to go to international arbitration 
and relatively little reason to fear a condemnatory decision by a 
regional human rights body. If the specter of international arbi-
tration has a further chilling effect on a host state’s ability to reg-
ulate and domestic courts’ 
willingness to hold foreign 
investors accountable, vic-
tims will continue to dispro-
portionately bear the costs of 
epic multi-forum litigation 
and delayed justice.
This article argues that, in 
recognition of the account-
ability gap and fundamental 
power imbalances, a supra-
national forum is needed 
to simultaneously hold for-
eign investors and states 
accountable for their relative 
share of harm to victims. 
An international human 
rights mechanism provides 
the most appropriate forum. 
Among such mechanisms, 
the regional human rights 
systems are best prepared 
based on their experience 
adjudicating individual 
claims that involve assess-
ing state responsibility for failure to protect against violations 
by non-state actors11 and even informally mediating between 
victims, foreign investors, and states.12 Regional human rights 
mechanisms could be adapted to offer a solution to the pres-
ent accountability gap if they were provided with (1) narrowly 
delimited jurisdiction over foreign investors who benefit from 
BIT protections when states prove unable and unwilling to 
offer a domestic forum for resolution of victims’ torts or human 
rights claims; (2) jurisdiction to join these foreign investors as 
co-respondents with states already defending claims brought by 
victims; and (3) the ability to apportion monetary damages or 
other remedies between the state and foreign investors.
The article will proceed with a brief analysis of the Lago 
Agrio litigation to illustrate the way BITs affect power dynam-
ics between host states and foreign investors, further sidelining 
the less economically powerful. It will then offer an overview 
[I]n recognition of 
the accountability gap 
and fundamental power 
imbalances, a supranational 
forum is needed to 
simultaneously hold 
foreign investors and states 
accountable for their relative 
share of harm to victims.
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of the business and human rights framework in which the argu-
ment is grounded and draw two analogies between international 
criminal law and broader human rights law: (1) the extension 
of accountability from states to non-state actors; and (2) the 
notion of complementarity between domestic and a suprana-
tional justice mechanisms. Next it will look at several cases 
in which the European, African, and Inter-American regional 
human rights systems have held states accountable for violations 
caused by corporate non-state actors. In such cases, regional 
organs already analyze the relative accountability of states and 
non-state corporate actors within the limitations of ultimate 
state accountability and politically permissible remedies; con-
sequently, the article argues that they could be adapted to close 
a critical accountability gap and bring more efficient justice to 
victims of investment-related human rights violations. In the 
final section, the article will return to Lago Agrio to illustrate 
briefly how such a mechanism could work in practice.
poWer politicS and tranSnational litigation  
in Lago agrio
The involvement of Texaco/Chevron13 in Ecuador over the 
thirty years of investment and seventeen years of transnational 
litigation illustrates the tragic and persistent accountability gap 
that results from the absence of a single justice mechanism for 
the triangle of actors discussed above. The Lago Agrio litigation 
involves multiple as-yet unsuccessful attempts in both U.S. and 
Ecuadorian forums to hold an economically powerful and legally 
well-advised transnational corporation accountable for its por-
tion of damages to indigenous communities in the Amazon. 
Neither has the Ecuadorian state — which participated through 
a state-owned enterprise in a consortium with Texaco and also 
neglected to regulate the consortium’s activities — been mean-
ingfully held accountable or repaired its share of damages. In 
the meantime, another generation of indigenous communities in 
Ecuador continues to wait for justice.
The impacts of oil development in the Amazon were dev-
astating. By 1992, when Texaco stopped operating in Ecuador, 
estimates were that decades of oil extraction had generated 19.3 
billion gallons of toxic wastewater, most of which was disposed 
in open, unlined pits; had spilled 16.8 million gallons of crude; 
and had burned a daily average of about 49 million cubic feet 
of natural gas without any emission controls.14 The Ecuadorian 
state and Texaco share responsibility for this massive damage. 
Texaco’s local subsidiary, TexPet, was the operating partner in 
a consortium with the state-owned enterprise Petroecuador.15 
Throughout the consortium’s operation, the state failed to 
regulate the consortium’s activities, instead allowing TexPet to 
self-regulate and relying on Texaco’s recognized international 
expertise in oil extraction,16 all the while enjoying its share of 
the profits.17
This article will not attempt to chronicle the Aguinda 
litigation in U.S. federal courts, the Lago Agrio litigation in 
Ecuadorian courts, or the numerous other related proceedings 
between other groups of plaintiffs, various lawyers, the state, 
and Texaco/Chevron.18 Suffice it to say that after nine years of 
litigation in U.S. federal court, Chevron succeeded in having the 
case against it — a class action filed under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act — dismissed for forum non conveniens in 2001.19 The case 
that was re-filed in Ecuador by some of the original plaintiffs 
has been ongoing since 2003. Without speculating as to its 
motivations, Ecuador’s interventions throughout the long his-
tory have not assisted in bringing an efficient, effective, or fair 
resolution — if that result would have been possible under any 
circumstances — to the plaintiffs’ attempts at judicial recourse. 
While the matter was pending in the U.S. district court, Ecuador 
intervened to support Texaco’s motion to dismiss;20 it negotiated 
without public consultation for remedial work and a final release 
of the state’s claims against Texaco;21 and it opposed interven-
tion by indigenous community representatives in its separate 
suit against Chevron in U.S. district court.22 During the later 
stage of litigation against Chevron in Ecuadorian courts,23 the 
government’s interventions — even if intended to improve the 
chances of judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor — seem to have fur-
nished Chevron with the evidence it needs to initiate BIT-based 
arbitration against the state on the grounds of an alleged denial 
of procedural justice.24
Despite Ecuador’s manifold violations of its human rights 
obligations, the introduction of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT has argu-
ably changed the investor-state power dynamic. The BIT creates 
additional due process protections for foreign investors tied to 
international standards25 that are arguably difficult to meet for 
states that continue to struggle with the rule of law. It also opens 
the possibility of international arbitration by the foreign investor 
against the state for any violation of the BIT terms.26 Negotiated 
on behalf of investors by a more powerful home state, in this case 
the United States, the BIT also reflects inter-state power dynam-
ics. Finally, its standards are flexible enough to offer ample 
fodder for argument to a sophisticated litigation team such as 
is normally employed by a transnational corporation seeking to 
avoid ultimate accountability at all costs. In so doing, the BIT 
arguably limits Ecuador’s ability — where Ecuador is actually 
willing — to provide adequate and effective judicial recourse to 
victims of human rights violations by foreign investors.
From a human rights perspective, the Ecuadorian state 
owes due process protections to everyone who comes before 
its judicial system, including foreign investors. Yet, there lurks 
in the background a question of fundamental fairness: should 
Chevron be able to benefit from lack of regulation and judicial 
independence when it stands to benefit and have an end-run opt-
out through BIT arbitration when it does not? For years, Texaco 
benefited from its ability to operate in a regulatory vacuum 
without needing to meet burdensome environmental standards. 
Then, although it argued that Ecuador’s judicial system was 
adequate,27 Texaco almost certainly sought dismissal from the 
U.S. district court because it stood a greater chance of defeating 
the Aguinda plaintiffs in an Ecuadorian court. When the politi-
cal attitude toward international economic relations changed 
after the election of President Rafael Correa28 and the govern-
ment was more inclined to support plaintiffs’ attempts to hold 
Chevron accountable, the lack of judicial independence and cor-
ruption looked less favorable. Yet, the BIT turned these factors 
into evidence needed for a possible way out of Ecuadorian courts 
and perhaps even to a damages award for Chevron. Accordingly, 
Chevron filed a BIT-based arbitration claim against Ecuador in 
September 2009 alleging “denial of justice” in the Lago Agrio 
proceedings.29 Although this claim is as yet unsettled,30 another 
arbitration tribunal awarded U.S. $700 million to Chevron in its 
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first arbitration claim against Ecuador to settle separate breach 
of contract cases against Petroecuador,31 which illustrates one 
way the second arbitration could be resolved.
tHe “protect, reSpect and reMedy” buSineSS 
and HuMan rigHtS FraMeWorK and analogy to 
coMpleMentarity in international criMinal laW
Under international human rights law, states have a duty to 
protect those under their jurisdiction against human rights viola-
tions by non-state actors.32 Accordingly, when non-state actors 
violate human rights, they are not themselves accountable under 
international human rights law; rather, states are held account-
able for these violations if they were complicit or failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent33 a violation the threat of which they 
were aware or should have been aware.34 After a violation, states 
also have a duty of due diligence to investigate, prosecute, and 
punish — whether implicating state or non-state actors — or 
provide a remedy or redress for the victim. Failure to fulfill these 
duties leads to state accountability.35 Against this background of 
firm legal duties, UN Special Representative Ruggies has coined 
the “protect, respect and remedy” framework for business and 
human rights: the state’s duty to protect; corporate responsibility 
to protect; and victims’ need for effective remedies.36
Such a system works quite well and makes sense when states 
actually exercise control over non-state actors — which may 
include individuals, organizations, rebel groups, corporations, 
et al — within their territories. But, when states really do not 
exercise control over certain non-state actors, human rights 
systems that only impose responsibility on states for failure to 
protect may actually reinforce impunity. Accordingly, interna-
tional criminal law allows direct prosecution of both state and 
non-state actors — although among non-state actors only natural 
and not judicial persons have been held accountable to date37 — 
for widespread violations that rise to the level of violating jus 
cogens norms. The state in which such violations occur may also 
face international human rights law responsibility if it failed to 
adequately investigate, prosecute, and punish non-state actors or 
was otherwise complicit in violations.38
Implicit in this system of accountability under international 
criminal law may be the recognition that sometimes non-state 
actors are stronger than and beyond the control of states, for 
example during times of conflict. To tie this to a jurisdictional 
principle, it could be argued that certain non-state actors are 
actually acting in international space — although they may 
formally be within a state’s territorial jurisdiction — if the 
state is too weak to regulate those actors and fulfill its duty 
to protect. This argument makes particular sense when the 
non-state actors frequently cross international borders — like 
the Lord’s Resistance Army wreaking havoc between Uganda, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African 
Republic, and the Sudan — perhaps even doing so deliberately 
to avoid the government forces of one state or another or befud-
dle normal jurisdictional rules and state sovereignty.
International criminal law is a useful analogy for the excep-
tion to ultimate state responsibility for human rights argued for 
in this article. As just discussed, it makes the leap to individual 
— and perhaps eventually corporate or other non-state entity39 
— liability for violations of international law. Moreover, the 
system put in place by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is founded on the principle of comple-
mentarity between States Parties and the ICC as a court of last 
resort. States Parties have the primary duty to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes, while the ICC only steps in 
where states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.40
Similarly, enforcement of the corporation’s responsibility 
to respect human rights usually falls within the state’s duty to 
protect and it is the state that should guarantee victims’ effective 
remedies. However, certain foreign investors that benefit from 
international protections of BITs negotiated between a home 
state and host state government have an unfair advantage over 
the host state government. Because such advantage — along 
with sheer economic power imbalances — may undermine the 
host state’s ability or willingness to regulate investors or provide 
effective remedies to victims, a supranational forum such as a 
regional human rights system should complement state mecha-
nisms and hold investors and host states accountable side by 
side.
prepared to taKe tHe leap: HoW regional HuMan 
rigHtS SySteMS analyze State accountability For 
HuMan rigHtS violationS cauSed by corporate  
non-State actorS
Regional human rights systems are designed to infringe as 
little as possible on state sovereignty while serving a comple-
mentary function aimed not to replace but to reinforce the 
state’s domestic incorporation and enforcement of human rights 
norms.41 Such exercise of restraint out of respect for the prin-
ciple of complementarity is the reason that the regional human 
rights systems are well positioned to take the next leap without 
abusing an expanded jurisdiction. Another reason is that the 
regional systems are able to balance the good and harmful 
effects of corporate actor’s behavior in light of multiple over-
lapping rights.42 The African system, for instance, recognizes 
not only a number of individual human rights, but also the col-
lective right to social, economic, and cultural development.43 
Evaluating corporate activities in such a regional system, thus, 
may require explicitly weighing progress made toward realizing 
a collective right to development against a specific individual’s 
or community’s rights that may be violated in the development 
process. Even systems that do not recognize the right to develop-
ment may employ other procedures to balance at-times conflict-
ing goals, for example by factoring them into analysis of the 
state’s margin of appreciation.
The cases discussed below aim to illustrate these strengths 
while demonstrating the analysis that all three of the regional 
human rights systems have used to hold states accountable for 
human rights violations caused by non-state corporate actors – 
a method of analysis that could easily be modified to instead 
apportion responsibility between the two. Generally, each court 
or commission identifies the harm caused by the corporate 
actor, often a negative environmental impact, and then assesses 
the state’s performance in light of its responsibility to protect 
victims against this harm, to investigate and prosecute the 
corporate actors, or to otherwise provide victims with effective 
remedies after the fact. This analysis is thus able to assess both 
affirmative action by the state that infringes on individuals’ or 
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communities’ rights — for instance the state’s granting permis-
sion for a corporation to undertake economic activity without 
required public consultation — as well as a state’s failure to 
take necessary action to regulate economic activity that involves 
abuses. Finally, the exploration below will allude to signs that 
the regional systems themselves are already taking steps to 
consider the direct liability of certain non-state corporate actors.
euRopean CouRt of Human RigHts
The European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) has ana-
lyzed a handful of cases involving failure to properly regulate 
corporate activity. However, the ECtHR tends in these cases 
to consider the accountability of states with relatively strong 
domestic regulation and law enforcement and involves smaller 
domestic corporate non-state actors rather than larger foreign 
investors. Although these cases do not typically deal with viola-
tions or impunity on the scale of those coming before the African 
or Inter-American systems, discussed further below, the ECtHR 
offers a useful analytical framework — including its approach to 
assessing the state’s margin of appreciation44 while still finding 
violations on the part of the state — in cases in which the state 
would almost always be deemed willing and able to regulate the 
corporate non-state actor.
In two principal cases, the ECtHR has developed a method 
for finding the state responsible for harm caused by corporate 
non-state actors when the state failed to take adequate steps to 
protect the rights to family and private life guaranteed under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Guerra case found Italy in violation of Article 8 for failure 
to provide information and warnings to residents in an area 
affected by a fertilizer plant’s toxic emissions.45 The López 
Ostra case held Spain accountable for a violation of Article 8 
because it failed to adequately control risks posed by a company 
that operated a sewage treatment plant, for instance by closing 
the plant or assisting affected parties to relocate in a timely 
manner.46 The ECtHR also indicated the limits of the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the state in balancing a community’s 
economic interests with individual rights, concluding that Spain 
“did not succeed in striking a fair balance between the interest 
of the town’s economic well-being — that of having a waste-
treatment plan — and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her 
right to respect for her home and her private and family life.”47
afRiCan system
The African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) has faced at least one case involving state responsibil-
ity for human rights violations by a large foreign investor, Royal 
Dutch Shell, where state actors were also directly implicated. In 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for 
Economic and Social Rights (SERAC and CESR) v. Nigeria,48 
the ACHPR found the state responsible for numerous human 
rights violations associated with oil extraction by a consortium 
between state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC) and Shell in the Ogoniland region.49
The complaint alleged that the Nigerian government had vio-
lated several rights enshrined in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights: the rights to health (Article 16) and to a 
clean environment (Article 24) of the Ogoni people. The state 
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both (1) directly participated through the NNPC, a majority 
shareholder in the consortium, in contamination of air, water, 
and land causing adverse health consequences to the Ogoni; and 
(2) failed to protect the Ogoni population from this type of harm 
caused by the consortium.50 Exercising restraint similar to the 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation analysis, the Commission con-
sidered that the government of Nigeria has the right to produce 
oil to improve the realization of economic and social rights for 
its people, but not without due care not to violate other rights 
in the process.51 Additionally, the Commission found the state 
responsible for a violation of the Ogoni people’s collective 
right to “freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources” 
pursuant to Article 21 due to the government’s failure to include 
the Ogoni in its consultations with the consortium.52 Finally, 
because of the Nigerian military’s further involvement in vio-
lence and destruction of property committed against the Ogoni 
in retaliation against their protests of the consortium’s activi-
ties, the Commission found the state in violation of additional 
explicit and implicit rights – including the right to life as well as 
the rights to property, housing, and food – protected under the 
Banjul Charter.53
In conclusion, the Commission remarked on the balance that 
the state must strike between competing priorities of economic 
development and protection of rights:
The Commission does not wish to fault governments 
that are laboring under difficult circumstances to 
improve the lives of their people. . . . The intervention 
of multinational corporations may be a potentially posi-
tive force for development if the State and the people 
concerned are ever mindful of the common good and 
the sacred rights of individuals and communities.54
The Commission’s final recommendations were for the 
new government to take further steps to ensure “compensation 
for victims of the human rights violations,” “a comprehensive 
cleanup of lands and rivers damaged by oil operations,” and 
“the safe operation of any further oil development . . . guaran-
teed through effective and independent oversight bodies for the 
petroleum industry.”55
In the decade since this 2001 ACHPR decision, Nigeria 
has allowed victims to seek remedies through domestic courts, 
which have twice awarded large monetary damages to victim 
communities.56 Shell has used its significant resources to appeal 
each judgment. Moreover, only Shell has argued these damages 
should be apportioned between the foreign investor and state-
owned enterprise. Meanwhile, Nigeria has not proven itself 
willing or able to effectively regulate oil companies in the Delta 
or clean up prior environmental degradation.57
In the face of continued and widespread human rights 
violations associated with foreign investment in Nigeria and 
elsewhere on the continent,58 the ACHPR is seeking ways to 
more directly address such violations caused by non-state cor-
porate actors, particularly those in the extractive industries. In 
November 2009, the Commission constituted a Working Group 
on Extractive Industries, Environment, and Human Rights 
Violations in Africa with a two-year research mandate that 
includes “inform[ing] the African Commission on the possible 
liability of non-state actors for human and peoples’ rights viola-
tions under its protective mandate.”59
inteR-ameRiCan system
The Inter-American system has addressed numerous situ-
ations akin to that faced by the Ogoni in Nigeria or the Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs in Ecuador, involving human rights violations 
on a community-wide scale resulting from joint public-private 
ventures or concessions granted to private corporations without 
any or adequate consultation with affected indigenous commu-
nities. Since the Awas Tingni case decided by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in 2001,60 the system has 
developed a method for preventing potential violations by non-
state corporate actors before they occur by allowing indigenous 
communities to challenge government concessions of land or 
natural resources.61
Within the cases emerging from the Inter-American system, 
there is a subset that commence after substantive human rights 
violations have resulted from the activities of corporate non-state 
actors — in short, cases in which a violation of procedural protec-
tions may be part of the complaint but come too late to serve a 
completely preventive function. These cases illustrate how the Inter-
American system often ties state responsibility for harm already 
caused by non-state actors to the requirement of an “adequate and 
effective remedy” through judicial recourse for violations of sub-
stantive rights caused entirely or in part by non-state actors.
Two IACHR cases in particular, Toledo Maya v. Belize and 
Community of San Mateo De Huanchora and Its Members v. 
Peru, demonstrate the method already employed by the Inter-
American system. In Toledo Maya, the indigenous community 
challenged Belize’s grant of logging and oil concessions on 
large portions of their ancestral land, among other failures 
by the state to protect and recognize the indigenous land and 
resource rights. The petition was filed in 1998, five years after 
the state first granted the concessions.62 Although by the time 
the Commission heard the case, the state claimed that all log-
ging and oil exploration had ceased, the community presented 
evidence that two large Malaysian timber companies had under-
taken significant logging during the interim period.63 This log-
ging activity, including clear-cutting, fell within the permitted 
scope of the concessions and was thus legal from the perspective 
of the foreign investors.64 Yet, since the state violated the indig-
enous community’s property rights when granting to conces-
sions, the Commission recommended that the state repair the 
environmental damage caused by logging.65
The San Mateo De Huanchora case66 is distinguishable from 
Toledo Maya because it involves domestic corporate non-state 
actors — not foreign investors — who blatantly violated national 
law; thus it was a case of state failure to regulate and enforce 
its own law. In San Mateo, a coalition of affected communities 
brought a complaint against Peru for its failure to address severe 
pollution from a field of toxic sludge produced by a mining 
company, Lizandro Proaño S.A.67 The IACHR granted the peti-
tioners’ request for precautionary measures and asked Peru to 
immediately conduct a new environmental assessment to deter-
mine how the sludge should be removed and begin work to trans-
fer and contain the sludge.68 The Commission also rejected the 
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state’s claim that the petitioners had failed to exhaust domestic 
remedies, which the government argued for based on its claims 
that criminal charges were pending against the company’s min-
ing director and an administrative proceeding was underway to 
shut down the mining company and remove the sludge.69 The 
Commission found that these measures did not constitute an 
“adequate and effective” remedy for the present harm resulting 
from the pollution, and moreover noted that the administrative 
proceedings had been pending for three years while the pollution 
continued.70
tHe Leap foRwaRd
Of all the cases surveyed above, perhaps only a case such 
as that of Shell in Nigeria — notable for its striking similarities 
to the Lago Agrio case — is one in which the narrow exception 
argued for in this article would apply. The other cases serve as 
a few examples of the methods employed by regional systems 
to ensure that under normal circumstances the state is responsi-
bility for protection of human rights and provision of effective 
remedies to victims. Moreover, these cases demonstrate the 
analysis employed by regional systems when facing violations 
that are the joint product of corporate failure to respect and state 
failure to protect or respect human rights. In a majority of these 
cases, ultimate and sole state accountability before the regional 
human rights systems seems appropriate. Yet, in instances of an 
economically powerful and legally well-advised transnational 
corporation that benefits from the protections of bilateral invest-
ment treaties, this system of accountability is less tenable. Shell, 
like Chevron in Ecuador, continues to use tremendous legal 
resources to avoid Nigerian attempts to hold it accountable for 
its share of damages, while pointing out that it should not be 
held solely accountable where it worked in consortium with a 
state-owned enterprise. In such circumstances, a supranational 
forum ultimately concerned with human rights and the avail-
ability of effective remedies is the appropriate forum for assess-
ing and apportioning damages between the state and the foreign 
investor.
a More eFFicient patH to JuStice?
Returning to Lago Agrio in Ecuador, this final section aims 
to sketch out how a regional human rights system such as the 
Inter-American could be adapted to provide a more efficient 
path to justice for victims who otherwise bear far too great a 
share of the costs of delayed justice. Years before the Aguinda 
suit was ever filed in the United States, the Huaorani people, 
one of the indigenous groups in Ecuador most impacted by 
the Texaco/Petroecuador consortium’s oil extraction in the 
Amazon, petitioned the IACHR alleging that other prospec-
tive oil development activities threatened numerous rights.71 In 
September 1991 and October 1993, the IACHR held hearings 
on the petition.72 Yet, the Commission realized that the “general 
claims lodged concerning the Huoarani [were] not unique.”73 
Accordingly, it organized a country visit to Ecuador, including 
Lago Agrio and its surroundings, and in 1997 issued a report 
on the human rights situation with chapters on human rights in 
Ecuador’s interior affected by oil development and on human 
rights issues of special relevance to indigenous communities.74 
The Commission found ample evidence to support a theory of 
state responsibility for human rights violations associated with 
oil extraction,75 and concluded its report with strong words:
Decontamination is needed to correct mistakes that 
ought never to have happened. Both the State and the 
companies conducting oil exploitation activities are 
responsible for such anomalies, and both should be 
responsible for correcting them. It is the duty of the 
State to ensure that they are corrected.76
While its actual recommendations were somewhat less 
forceful, they did include calling for Ecuador to undertake “pre-
ventive and remedial action” and reminding the state that it is 
obliged to ensure “that all individuals of the Oriente have access 
to effective judicial recourse to lodge claims concerning the 
rights under the Constitution and the American Convention.”77
In the ensuing thirteen years, Ecuador has progressed little 
in complying with these recommendations, a fact which may be 
faulted to both the government and the power dynamics identi-
fied at the outset of this article. At the time of the Commission’s 
visit, Texaco was undertaking remedial work pursuant to its 
MoU with Petroecuador and the Ecuadorian state,78 and the 
Commission was able to document the affected community’s 
mixed responses to the work.79 No matter the criticisms of how 
Texaco executed its remedial work, the MoU divided the reme-
dial work to be done and the part delegated to Petroecuador has 
yet to be completed. Some affected communities, and perhaps 
even the government, seem to be waiting for a judgment against 
Chevron to pay for a major remediation project.80 Other affected 
communities like the Kichwa and Huaorani are “beginning to 
develop and implement remedial projects themselves, rather 
than simply denouncing, exhorting, petitioning — and waiting 
for others to act.”81
As for judicial recourse, Ecuador passed a new law in 1998 
creating a cause of action for individuals to sue for environ-
mental damage; this law was one of the legal bases for the suit 
filed by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs. But, the Ecuadorian judiciary 
did not permit a separate complaint by a broader coalition of 
indigenous plaintiffs to proceed in seeking recourse against 
Chevron.82 Moreover, whether it speaks to perceived or real lack 
of judicial independence, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs did not bring 
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a suit against the state-owned Petroecuador;83 nor has Chevron 
impleaded Petroecuador in the suit against it in Ecuador. Finally, 
until the Lago Agrio suit is actually resolved — and unless it 
results in complete environmental remediation that eliminates 
the continuing dangers to the health and lives of people in the 
affected communities84 — that form of judicial recourse cannot 
be deemed effective.
But imagine if the Huoarani community’s 1990 petition had 
been based on past rather than prospective harm caused by oil 
extraction and had alleged direct violations by the state and vio-
lations of its duty to protect. Imagine that the Commission had 
permitted such a complaint to proceed, finding that domestic 
remedies would be ineffective under the circumstances because 
the judiciary would be unable to hear a complaint against a 
state-owned entity or against a foreign investor that had been 
part of a consortium with a state-owned entity. Imagine that the 
Commission had proceeded with its state visit and issued its 
recommendations to Ecuador as part of an Article 50 report in 
response to the Huoarani community petition. After the required 
time passed and Ecuador did not seem to be complying with 
recommendations, imagine that the Commission had referred 
the petition to the Inter-American Court. Then, imagine that 
at some point in the preparations for hearings, the Court took 
judicial notice of developments in the litigation against Chevron 
in Ecuador and determined that the state was unable or unwill-
ing to provide effective remedy against Chevron in its judicial 
system on account of its BIT obligations to a foreign investor. 
Then, upon this finding, imagine that the Court had been able 
to join the foreign investor and the respondents in a single case 
responding to the petitioners’ claims. Finally, imagine that after 
evaluating the harm to the petitioners and the defenses presented 
by both respondents, the Court had been able to grant an appro-
priate remedy that apportioned damages according to relative 
fault between the foreign investor and Ecuador, resolving in a 
single supranational proceeding all related claims between the 
three parties.
In embarking on this flight of imagination, this article does 
not deny the substantial procedural and jurisdictional changes 
that would be required for the regional human rights systems to 
make such adaptation — nor does it underestimate the political 
barriers any attempts at such adaptation would surely encounter. 
The Organization of American States and the African Union 
might have to revisit the constitutive documents for each of 
the regional organs; the regional organs would have to modify 
their rules of procedure and develop jurisprudence to govern 
the exceptional joinder of foreign investors to proceedings; and 
there might have to be some consent to the jurisdiction of such 
organs by foreign investors.85
This article will not go further in sketching out these 
logistics as each step would require many parties negotiating 
and exploring the boundaries and overlaps between the as-yet 
un-harmonized bodies of international human rights and inter-
national investment law. It would also involve confronting the 
very triangulation and power imbalances that have resulted in 
the accountability gap for both host states and foreign investors 
to the detriment of victims. Suffice it to say that adaptation of 
regional human rights systems to fill an identified accountability 
gap is possible and is perhaps the path least fraught with dif-
ficulties that could provide victims with a more effective and 
more efficient justice than what they have found thus far in Lago 
Agrio.   HRB
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